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Abstract Cloud services providers practice security-induced lock-in when employing cryptography and tamperresistance to limit the portability and interoperability of
users’ data and applications. Moreover, security-induced
lock-in and users’ anti-lock-in strategies intersect within
the context of platform competition. When users deploy
anti-lock in strategies, such as using a hybrid cloud, a
leader–follower pricing framework increases profits for
cloud services providers relative to Nash equilibrium prices. This creates a second-mover advantage, as the follower’s increase in profits exceeds that of the leader owing
to the potential for price undercutting. By contrast, introducing or enhancing security-induced lock-in creates both
an increase in profits and a first-mover advantage. Cloud
services providers therefore favor security-induced lock-in
over price leadership. More broadly, we show why standardization of semantics, technologies, and interfaces is a
nonstarter for cloud services providers.
Keywords Cloud services providers  Cybersecurity 
Lock-in  Switching costs  Anti-lock-in strategies 
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1 Introduction
Cloud services providers (CSPs) convert users’ fixed IT
costs into variable ones through a pay-as-you go system
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that is finely granular and readily available. For small and
medium enterprises and start-ups, cloud benefits include
increased availability and mobility, and on-demand
capacity and scalability, thereby reducing entry barriers.
Larger users can also fully capitalize on the cloud’s
potential for ubiquity and increased collaboration. The
cloud services stack is divided into Infrastructure-as-aService (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Worldwide end-user spending
on cloud services is expect to grow from $145.3 billion in
2017 to $362.3 billion in 2022 (Statistica.com 2021).
CSPs exhibit substantial capacity requirements (e.g.,
server farms) and low marginal costs from virtualization.
This leads to the commodification of services at any given
layer in the stack. Yet semantics, technologies, and interfaces are not standardized across CSPs. Cloud computing is
not a simple matter of plug and play. In addition, lack of
standardization across CSPs raises current and prospective
users’ antennae to lock-in barriers to switching. Formally,
the vendor lock-in problem in cloud computing exists when
users’ dependency upon their CSP’s proprietary configurations create switching costs limiting users’ business
opportunities. CSP lock-in stems from users’ lack of
portability and interoperability. Portability refers to the
degree that data and applications are in a compatible format, giving users the ability to migrate to an alternative
CSP and do so with minimal effort. Portability includes the
means to verifiably remove and delete data housed in a
CSP (Hogan et al. 2011). Interoperability refers to users’
ability to exchange assets seamlessly across CSPs (interoperate) (Pectu 2011).
This study recognizes the paramount nature of data as a
business asset. Its focus is on data lock-in arising from CSP
users’ difficulties in both migrating data and doing so
without disrupting its availability. Data lock-in persists as a
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major obstacle to portability and interoperability (Armbrust
et al. 2010; Subramanian and Jevaraj 2019). It has implications for users’ business continuity and disaster recovery
planning (Knipp et al. 2016). If a CSP fails for economic or
financial reasons, organizational data may be unrecoverable or access to it delayed. Moreover, no CSP is 100%
reliable. Businesses locked into a CSP are vulnerable to
downtime.
Lock-in is a vulnerability rather than a threat. It is a
security issue because CSPs store data in a proprietary way.
Indeed, users do not own the facilities where CSPs store
their sensitive data, have limited control over it, and may
not even know the facilities’ exact physical locations.
Furthermore, a ‘‘walled garden’’ facilitates lock-in. Indeed,
Anderson (2004, 2020) contends that lock-in encourages IT
platforms to add security benefiting themselves rather than
users. Adding security mechanisms such as cryptography
and tamper-resistance also controls compatibility. ‘‘Sometimes security solutions might be focused on other objectives than security, for instance, on achieving consumer
lock-in’’ (Asghari et al. 2016, p. 269). Following OparaMartins et al. (2016, p. 2), ‘‘it can be concluded that cloud
interoperability (and data portability) constraints are
potentially results of an anticompetitive environment created by offering services with proprietary standards.’’
Lookabaugh and Sicker (2004) call this security-induced
lock-in.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
theoretically examine this facet of CSP security, which
differs from how security against malicious threats (cybersecurity) works to keep users from switching (Arce
2020a; Sen et al. 2020). There is a difference between
users’ decision to switch owing to cyber (in)security versus
users’ (in)ability to switch owing to security-induced lockin. Security-induced lock-in is a variation on Young and
Yung’s (1996) classic theme that cryptography can be used
to lower users’ security by maintaining control over a
critical resource.
This paper investigates security-induced lock-in within
the context of CSP platform competition. The term platform competition comes from the economics of two-sided
markets (e.g., Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Tatsumoto
2021); it applies equally to IaaS and SaaS in addition to
PaaS. As lock-in is a competitive phenomenon, it makes
sense to investigate lock-in within CSPs’ competitive
environment. Indeed, when characterizing CSP cybersecurity against malicious threats within the context of
platform competition, Arce (2020a) shows that cybersecurity both determines a CSP’s competitive environment
(e.g., monopolistic versus imperfectly competitive) and is
determined by the competitive environment. Sen et al.
(2020) derive the relationship between cybersecurity and
whether a software market is monopolistic or perfectly
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competitive. These studies provide context for the current
analysis, which theoretically investigates the synergy
between security, lock-in, and leadership in CSP platform
competition. It contributes to the literature quantifying and
qualifying Anderson’s (2001) discourse on how economic
considerations make information security hard.
Security-induced lock-in is a form of strategic IT
investment limiting users’ ability to switch CSPs that
themselves engage in platform competition. Alternatively,
Barua et al. (1991) examine strategic IT investment for
obtaining a competitive advantage by improving users’
quality of service. They focus on the non-price implications
of combining services as a means to strategically increase
quality. By contrast, security-induced lock-in creates pricing power and data access barriers that are detrimental to
users. Moreover, users are not passive with respect to the
effects of lock-in; they both anticipate the effect of lock-in
on future prices and implement anti-lock-in strategies. An
example of an anti-lock-in strategy is a hybrid cloud where
organizationally critical data is kept in-house by the user.
This research considers a 2-CSP game of pricing competition and data lock-in where users also determine the
degree of lock-in via anti-lock-in strategies. At the same
time, data lock-in is modeled similarly to how Gordon and
Loeb (2002), Ruan (2017), and Arce (2018) probabilistically model security and vulnerability to malicious threats,
in that CSP competition and users’ anti-lock-in strategies
co-determine the probability of access to data (Razavian
et al 2013). The presence of users’ anti-lock-in strategies
implies lock-in is neither complete, as is usually the case in
economic models of lock-in, nor completely absent, as is
the case for users who do not adopt a CSP for fear of lockin. The characterization of CSP pricing strategies, lock-in
strategies, and users’ switching costs and anti-lock-in
strategies occurs under the auspices of CSP platform
competition.
The resulting game additionally differs from prior
treatments of lock-in because lock-in is security-induced
and determined by users’ anti-lock-in strategies and platform competition between CSPs. Under such circumstances the CSPs’ prices are strategic complements. Yet
they are inefficient relative to the CSPs’ joint profit-maximizing prices. Both CSPs’ profits increase via price
leadership. Hence, price leadership is a means to counter
users’ anti-lock-in strategies. A coordination problem
exists, however, as the follower benefits more than the
leader; i.e., a second-mover advantage occurs owing to the
possibility of undercutting. It is akin to Cloud 1.0, with its
emphasis on pay-as-you-go subscription services that shift
users’ fixed IT costs to CSPs.
In contrast to the second-mover advantage for the case
of price leadership, the findings here establish conditions
for a first-mover advantage in security-induced lock-in.
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Consequently, standardization is a non-starter for CSPs.
The conditions critically depend on the differences in a
CSP’s profit sensitivity to their rival’s price. Game-theoretically, price competition is characterized in terms of
strategic complements, a property pertaining to the CSPs’
best reply functions. Cross-price profit sensitivities are
instead a matter of the degree that CSP prices are plain
complements, a property pertaining to the CSPs’ profit
functions (Eaton and Eswaran 2002). These conditions
point toward the evolution of Cloud 2.0 and the transformational potential of cloud computing, with CSPs competing beyond price by adding to the value proposition of
users.
As a broader contribution, security-induced lock-in is an
example of an interoperability barrier to competition. ‘‘If a
platform is required to be interoperable, that opens access
to the platform, that lowers entry barriers and then, suddenly, you have more competition,’’ implying that interoperability is a powerful regulatory tool (Scott Morton
2021). This study characterizes the power of interoperability regulation in terms of the relative effects of user’s
anti-lock-in strategies versus security-induced lock-in by
CSPs. It also differs from how restricting barriers to data
portability at the consumer level functions as an anti-lockin strategy that changes the competitive environment of
platforms whose business model is based on transforming
data into revenue (e.g., Wohlfarth 2019). The users in this
study are firms contracting with CSP services for their
employees and proprietary data rather than users as individual consumers with personal data.

2 The Nature of CSP Lock-In
There is widespread recognition of lock-in in the cloud,
however, few models address it head on. Klemperer (1995)
provides an overview of the general economic literature
surrounding lock-in and switching costs. Complementary
surveys include Padilla (1991), Farrell and Klemperer
(2007), and Villas-Boas (2015). Shapiro and Varian (1999)
and Varian (2004) address lock-in, switching costs, and
information technology. Lookabaugh and Sicker (2004)
discuss four categories of security-induced lock-in: proprietary security protocols; open security protocols; proprietary extensions to open security protocols; and
intellectual property rights and other legal constructs.
Users endow CSPs with quasi-monopoly power. Recognizing this, users fear the well-known bargain-then-ripoffs phenomenon associated with vendor-user relationships
in the presence of lock-in. CSPs attempt to allay users’
fears with future price commitments. The problem with the
pay-as-you-go nature of CSP subscriptions is price commitments do not fully capture the user-CSP value
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proposition. CSPs introduce fees as a form of cost-of-service-creep; implement a razors-and-blades strategy with
respect to add-on services and components; and also vary
quality of service in ways users may be unable to detect.
The effects are similar to CSPs practicing a form of price
discrimination between new and locked-in users. The end
result is akin to a CSP’s inability to commit beyond its
initial price at the time of adoption, with this as our
modeling strategy. Consequently, a CSP cannot create
switching costs by committing to a lower second-period
price for continuing users, as is the case in Caminal and
Matutes (1990). Instead, security-induced lock-in creates
switching costs via barriers to interoperability and
portability.
Lock-in increases CSPs’ pricing power. But users are
not passive observers to the process; they act strategically
to protect themselves from its adverse effects and use it to
their advantage when possible (Shapiro and Varian 1999).
In our analysis, foresighted users carefully balance the
tradeoff between the benefits of lock-in; e.g., more powerful implementation when the CSP couples tightly with
the user’s business requirements; with the costs, which are
most closely associated with increasing prices over time.
Switching costs also arise due to learning effects. It
takes time for a user’s employees to learn the proprietary
aspects of their CSP. Any time required to learn the proprietary aspects of the next best alternative CSP is a
switching cost. Shapiro and Varian (1999) regard the total
switching costs of locked-in users as the value of an IT
platform’s installed base. As users’ experience with their
CSP increases, their benefits grow and become specific to
the CSP. Switching to a rival results in lost learning effects.
Our model recognizes this.
Network effects as well work against switching CSPs.
Network effects (network externalities) occur when the
benefits of using a CSP rise with the number of users of the
CSP. Opara-Martins et al. (2016) find that organizations
with 250 ? employees realize significant benefits from
increased collaboration through CSPs. Users’ switching
costs are increased by the presence of network effects. This
is reflected in our model by an increased valuation for
continuing with a CSP in the second period as compared to
a lower valuation if the user switches CSPs. Hence, CSPs
face a no-switching constraint that accounts for both the
potential for switching and its impact on users. Within the
context of platforms-as-two-sided-markets, Lee (2014)
proposes the no-switching criterion to characterize nonmonopolistic platform equilibria on the complementor
(e.g., app) side when platform-complementor contracts are
contingent on the number of complementors. Arce (2020a)
subsequently employs the no-switching criterion to characterize the symbiotic relationship between cybersecurity
and CSP market structure on the user side under platform
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competition, when cybersecurity attacks are based on the
number of users (market share). As CSPs are platforms,
and security-induced-lock-in and anti-lock-in strategies
affect switching costs, this equilibrium criterion is invoked
here as well. To wit, when platforms’ strategies satisfy the
no-switching criterion, the competitive environment can
allow for multiple platforms rather than being monopolistic. The no-switching criterion therefore lies at the foundation of analyzing strategic interaction amongst two or
more CSPs, as no level of the CSP stack is monopolistic. In
particular, for multiple CSPs to persist within a level of the
CSP stack, each CSP’s pricing strategy must satisfy a noswitching constraint in equilibrium.
Technically, the no-switching criterion is related to the
concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim
et al. 1989). This refinement requires a CSP’s equilibrium
strategies to be stable against a credible deviation from the
equilibrium by a subset of players (Greenberg 1989; Kahn
and Mookherjee 1992). In the present context, this implies
that a CSPs strategies rule out losing a subset (coalition) of
its users owing to alternative pricing policies of a rival
CSP. Effectively, under this criterion the CSPs’ strategies
ensure that no ‘‘tipping’’ occurs that would otherwise lead
to monopoly. As such, the resulting platform competition
need not be winner-take-all or winner-take-most, but is
instead consistent with the reality of multiple CSPs competing within the cloud stack. By contrast, much of the
extant literature on platform economics assumes platformas-monopoly and yet we know that this is not the case in
the CSP market. Hence, another contribution of this analysis is placing CSPs within a non-monopolistic context.
The discussion thus far substantiates the need for a
model of CSP pricing and security-induced lock-in within
the context of platform competition. Such a model requires
(i) switching costs reflecting users’ learning and network
effects with their CSP; (ii) lock-in strategies by CSPs in
platform competition; (iii) users adopting anti-lock-in
strategies to keep their CSP options open; and (iv) noswitching equilibrium constraints as a means of capturing
the strategic effects of platform competition among CSPs.
The following section introduces a corresponding extensive
form game.

3 The Model
The players are the two CSPs and N users. CSP i’s
strategies are its prices in the first and second periods, (Pi1,
Pi2); i = 1, 2. In addition, CSP i’s lock-in strategy partially
determines the value of lock-in variable, ki [ [0, 1]: its
users’ degree of data access if switching CSPs. When
ki = 0, the user is completely locked-in; if ki = 1, the user
is not locked-in whatsoever. Given the first-period prices
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for the two CSPs, P11 and P21, the number of CSP 1 users
is n(P11, P21), and the number of CSP 2 users is its complement, N - n(P11, P21). Two standard assumptions about
n(P11, P21) hold: (i) n(P11, P21) is twice-continuously differentiable over all its arguments, and (ii) when both CSPs’
second-period prices, P12 and P22, satisfy no-switching (or
participation) constraints, then n(P11, P21) and N - n(P11,
P21) carry over to the second period. This is why we write
n(P11, P21) as a form of shorthand notation rather than
n((P11, P12), (P21, P22)). However, we do identify and
discuss the effects of P12 and P22 on n(, ) and P11 and P21
below.
When first-period users carry over to the second period,
the CSPs’ profits (payoffs) are
P1 ¼ nðP11 ; P21 ÞP11 þ nðP11 ; P21 ÞP12  FC1 ;
P2 ¼ ½N  nðP11 ; P21 ÞP21 þ½N  nðP11 ; P21 ÞP22  FC2 :
CSP i’s profit is the sum of its first and second period
revenues less its fixed costs, FCi. The origins of many
CSPs stem from employing excess capacity used to support
their firm’s primary business, such as servers for AWS, or
the ability to scale at or near zero marginal cost, as is the
case for SaaS. This specification of a CSP’s profit function
is also in keeping with users shifting fixed IT costs to CSPs.
A CSP’s marginal cost is equal to zero unless maximum
capacity is reached, with the CSP business model premised
on leveraging capacity to preclude such an event. Specifically, multi-tenancy facilitates guaranteed performance
through a virtuous cycle where more users implies both
more funds for capacity investment and less variation in
overall average demand. This in turn implies the CSP
needs less capacity and can charge lower prices that lead to
more users.
An alternative interpretation of the payoff functions is
CSPs are, effectively, revenue-maximizers, as is the case
for the platforms investigated in Wohlfarth (2019). Such an
interpretation of CSP behavior is independent of assumptions about the CSPs’ cost structure.
No discounting occurs for users or CSPs. In multi-period
pricing games with switching costs, discount factors are a
proxy for how forward-looking (price sensitive) users are
to the CSP strategy of enticing users with a low first-period
price followed by a higher second-period price once users
are locked in. Forward-looking users recognize this
potentiality and are less price sensitive in the first period.
CSPs recognize user’s price insensitivity, consequently,
first-period prices are higher when users are forwardlooking. Discounting is replaced by the probability that a
user can access their data when attempting to switch CSPs,
ki 2 ½0; 1; which is an alternative forward-looking phenomenon. In contrast to discounting, which is an
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exogenous preference, ki is determined by users’ anti-lockin strategies and platform competition between CSPs.
For example, Fonash and Schneck (2015) note that the
presence of a walled garden may induce users to acquire
additional products and services from a single CSP because
the nature of the shared security problem is known. Consequently, the value of ki decreases: ‘‘This commits the
user to the deployed (CSP) solution even if a demonstrably
more useful or functional alternative exists’’ (p. 46). For
example, if the CSP uses homeomorphic encryption, then
users can process their data without the key and may base
essential applications on this relationship with their CSP.
At the same time, CSP possession of the key inhibits data
portability. Indeed, industry studies reveal, ‘‘CSPs can use
data preservation, in particular, as a means of vendor lockin by making data transfer to another service time-consuming or cumbersome’’ (Lynn 2021, p. 34). In anticipation of data lock-in, Raj et al. (2021) recommend manual
data exportation into a standard format on a regular basis.
This increases the value of ki. Other anti-lock-in strategies
include keeping proprietary data in-house, resulting in a
hybrid cloud or layered architecture; using a CSP broker or
cloud management provider; monitoring CSP updates and
assessing their impact on lock-in; employing enterprise
service bus middleware for cloud-user integration that
facilitates decoupling; or developing data export functionality on one’s own. Opting for a CSP with standard
interfaces and APIs, employing standard open security
protocols, ensuring that all data can be exported via open
file formats and platform-independent language are also
possibilities that increase ki.
More broadly, lock-in occurs due to unique implementations in semantics, technologies, and interfaces adopted
by different CSPs, which hinders user portability and
interoperability.
The lock-in situation is evident in that applications
developed for specific cloud platforms (e.g., Amazon
EC2, Microsoft Azure), cannot easily be migrated to
other cloud platforms and users become vulnerable to
any changes made by their providers … The degree
to which lock-in critically affects an organization’s
business application and operation in the cloud cannot be overemphasized or underestimated (OparaMartins et al. 2016, pp. 2, 8).
Such circumstances decrease the value of ki.
At the extremes, ki ¼ 0 if a user pushes all of its chips in
with a CSP in order to ensure interoperability under their
CSP’s proprietary cybersecurity solutions umbrella. By
contrast, ki ¼ 1 if the two CSPs operate in the same
cybersecurity ecosystem or federation. Most users and
CSPs operate in between these extremes, with ki 2 ð0; 1Þ
being the focus of this study.
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Users select a CSP in the first period and decide whether
to continue with the CSP in the second period. Users’
payoffs are the sum of their net benefits in each period
(again, no discounting). A user adopting CSP ‘i’ in period 1
obtains net benefit V - Pi1. The absence of an index on
users’ initial reservation value, V, of their CSP is intentional. Users’ initial impetus for adopting a CSP is to
transform fixed IT capital expenses into pay-as-you-go
variable operating costs. Hence, V is the initial savings in
fixed IT capital expenses irrespective of the CSP adopted.
By contrast, a user continuing with CSP ‘i’ in the second
period receives benefit Vi, where Vi [ (V, ?). Specifying
Vi [ V is consistent with accruing learning and network
effects when continuing with a CSP. User heterogeneity
exists at the CSP level in the second period, thereby
implying differences in users’ two-period valuation for
choosing CSP ‘i’ when continuing with CSP ‘i.’
A subtle but important point is a user who switches
CSPs in period 2 gets benefit V because no learning effect
carries over to the new CSP. Given users are now in the
first period of their relationship with newly-adopted CSP
‘j,’ they pay Pj1. In other words,
User 
i’s second-period expected payoff
Vi  Pi2 ;
if continues with CSP i;
¼
ki V  Pj1 ; if switches to CSP j 6¼ i:
Switching costs are captured by this model through the
inequalities ki V  V\V i : The resulting dynamics are not
commonly present in models of lock-in. First, users experience learning effects when continuing with a CSP,
V\V i ; an advantage of lock-in owing to switching cost
V i  V: Moreover, economists often refer to the degree to
which network externalities contribute to V i exceeding V as
a collective switching cost (Crémer and Biglaiser 2012).1
Second, the switching payoff, ki V\V i , or cost V i  ki V,
imparts a multiperiod flavor. It is as if a switching user
induces another subgame where it selects the other CSP.
Hence, we solve a stage game where users have the
potential to switch, but in equilibrium they do not switch.
That is, the switching subgame is not reached because the
equilibrium satisfies the no-switching constraint:
ki V  Pj1  V i  Pi2 :
This criterion is akin to Shaked and Sutton’s (1984)
technique for deriving the unique solution to Rubinstein’s
(1982) alternating offers bargaining model by focusing on
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where the initial
offer is accepted. Their initial-offer-accepted constraint
puts downward pressure on the initial proposer’s
1

Here the cloud network effect is collectively within user groups, as
identified by Opara-Martins, Sahandi, and Tian (2016), rather than
between user groups.
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bargaining share. Consequently, the subgame where the
initial offer is rejected is not reached. Here, in recognizing
that, in reality, users switch CSPs, a no-switching equilibrium constraint formalizes how the potential for
switching puts downward pressure on a CSP’s second-period price. This in turn affects the characterization of the
CSPs’ equilibrium prices in both periods. The advantage is
the no-switching constraint places our analysis within the
context of CSP platform competition rather than CSP
platform-as-monopoly.
The timing of the game reflects the above description.
The stage game consists of two periods. In the first period,
CSPs set initial prices and users decide which CSP to
adopt. CSPs again set prices in the second period and users
decide whether to continue with their CSP or to switch.
Following Klemperer (1995), endogenizing switching costs
requires inserting an initial (‘zeroth’) period determining
the degree of lock-in prior to the stage game. A major
difference between the present analysis and other analyses
of switching costs is switching cost manipulation is typically considered to be the purview of firms alone (Salies
2012). The contribution here is (i) users employ anti-lockin strategies; (ii) lock-in takes an alternative form because
it is security-induced; and (iii) no-switching constraints
incorporate learning and direct network effects. Together,
the three phenomena are specific to the user-CSP relationship under platform competition. Finally, in recognizing Shapiro and Varian’s (1999) principle that the potential
for lock-in necessitates participants to look ahead and
reason back, the solution concept used is subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE); i.e., backward induction. In
particular, this implies that when deciding on a CSP in
period 1, a user not only takes into account each CSP’s
period 1 price, but also correctly anticipates the prices each
CSP charges in period 2.



max n P11 ; P21  P12

0  V1  P12
:
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ
ﬄ}
0
users participation
constraint


Lock-in implies n P11 ; P21 carries over to period 2.
This yields P12 ¼ V1 :
In the first period CSP 1 selects P11 to maximize P1:




max n P11 ; P21  P11 þ n P11 ; P21  P12  FC1
P11




¼ max n P11 ; P21  P11 þ n P11 ; P21  V1  FC1 :
s:t:

P12

P11

Suppressing the arguments in n(P11, P21), CSP 1’s firstorder condition is
oP1
on
on
¼
 P11 þ n þ
 V1 ¼ 0 )
oP11 oP11
oP11
:

on 
 P11 þ V1
n¼
oP11

ð1Þ

An interior solution (n [ 0) requires oPon \0; i.e., the
11
number of users satisfies the law of demand. From the
characterization of n given by Eq. (1),

on
on
o2 n 
¼
 2  P11 þ V1 )
oP11
oP11 oP11
:
ð2Þ
on
1 o2 n
¼   2  ðP11 þ V1 Þ
2 oP
oP11
11

2

It follows that oPon \0 requires o 2n [ 0: User demand is
11
oP11
convex. Furthermore, the first-period
elasticity of demand
is



 on
P11
P11
P11

n
 ¼
eP ¼ 
 
¼
:
11
oP11 n P11 ; P21  P11 þ V1 P11 þ P12
First-period demand is inelastic ðenP \1Þ: Price insen11
sitivity is due to users looking ahead and reasoning back
(P12 is in the denominator of enP Þ; thereby keeping CSPs
11

4 Benchmark Scenario: Platform Competition
when Users are Locked-In
In the benchmark scenario users are locked into their CSP
in the second period. Variables in this section have an
overbar to distinguish them from the general case. When
users are locked-in, ki ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2:
Solving the game by SPNE means the second period is
solved first. As in the first period a CSP cannot commit to a
price in the second period, in the second period each CSP
sets its price to maximize its profit. Given ki ¼ 0; instead
of facing a no-switching constraint, the CSP must satisfy its
users’ participation constraint. For CSP 1,

from duping users with a low first-period price.
Finally, if no learning effects are present, then V1= V2 = V. Price competition without product differentiation ensures neither CSP makes excess profits:




Pi ¼ ni Pi1 ; Pj1 Pi1 þ ni Pi1 ; Pj1 V  FCi ¼ 0 )
FCi
  V:
Pi1 ¼ 
ni Pi1 ; Pj1
A CSP’s first-period price equals its average fixed cost
less its second-period revenue.

5 Imperfect Data Lock-In
Here, the general game where ki [ (0, 1) is solved. Backward induction implies the second period is solved first.
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Once again, in the first period the CSP cannot commit to a
price in the second period. Each CSP sets its second-period
price subject to a no-switching constraint for users.
Specifically, the no-switching constraint accounts for the
probability, ki, of a user accessing its data to switch CSPs.
In addition, when the no-switching constraint supersedes
the need for a participation constraint for users, CSP 1’s
pricing problem becomes
max nðP11 ; P21 Þ  P12
P12
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The first-order condition for CSP 1 is
oP1
on
on
¼
 P11 þ n þ
 ½V 1  k1 V þ P21  ¼ 0:
oP11
oP11 oP11
CSP 1’s best reply function is an implicit function,
F1(P11, P21, k1):
F 1 ðP11 ; P21 ; k1 Þ ¼ n þ

s:t: k1 V  P21  V1  P12 :
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}

on
 ½P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21  ¼ 0:
oP11
ð3Þ

users0 noswitching constraint

It follows that CPS 1’s second-order condition requires
For the no-switching constraint to supersede the participation constraint it must be the case that k1V - P21 [ 0
) k1 [ P21/V; otherwise, k1V - P21 B 0, implying the
participation constraint is instead binding, and the benchmark model applies. Similarly, for CSP 2 it implies
k2 [ P11/V. Alternatively, if the inequalities do not hold
the CSPs can price as if k1, k2 = 0.
Result 1. If users’ probability of data access falls below a
certain threshold, k1 B P21/V and k2 B P11/V, then CSPs
can price as if users are locked-in.
As the context of this study is platform competition, we
turn to the case where the conditions in Result 1 are
reversed. Hence, the no-switching constraints apply.
Solving the no-switching constraint for P122:
P12  V1  k1 V þ P21 :
A similar no-switching constraint for CSP 2 yields P22:
P22  V2  k2 V þ P11 :
When the no-switching constraints bind, second-period
prices are lower under imperfect lock-in: Pi2 [ P12 :
Imperfect lock-in implies CSPs price strategically in the
second period. Whereas users’ consumer’s surplus, Vi 
Pi2 ; is zero under perfect lock-in, it is positive, Vi - Pi2[ 0, under the price competition implied by imperfect
lock-in.
5.1 First-Period Best Replies
Substituting the solutions for second-period prices, P12 and
P22, into the two-period profit functions for each CSP,
P1 ¼ nðP11 ; P21 ÞP11 þ nðP11 ; P21 Þ½V1  k1 V þ P21   FC1 ;
P2 ¼ ðN  nðP11 ; P21 ÞÞP21 þ ðN  nðP11 ; P21 ÞÞ
½V2  k2 V þ P11   FC2 :

2
The upper bound on P12, V1 - k1V ? P21, is positive. A negative
upper bound results if k1 [ (V1 ? P21)/V. As V1 [ V, and the secondperiod equilibrium occurs in the positive orthant of the (P21, P22)
plane, k1 [ (V1 ? P21)/V [ 1. But k1 is a probability and a probability cannot take a value greater than 1, thereby establishing a
contradiction.

o2 P 1
oP211

oF 1
¼ oP
\0:
11

The number of CSP 1 users is
n¼

on
 ½P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21 :
oP11

ð4Þ

where n [ 0 again requires oPon11 \0: The number of CSP 1
users decreases in the CSP’s first-period price. Furthermore, for the inequality to hold, by the characterization of
n in Eq. (4):
on
on
o2 n
¼
 2  ½P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21  )
oP11
oP11 oP11
on
1 o2 n
¼
 ½P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21 
oP11
2 oP211

;

2

o n
which, to be negative, again requires oP
2 [ 0:
11
The first-period price elasticity of demand is


onðP11 ; P12 Þ

P11

enP11 ¼ 

oP11
nðP11 ; P12 Þ
P11
P11
¼
¼
;
P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21 P11 þ P12

which again is inelastic. First-period price inelasticity is
usually an assumption in technology adoption and switching
cost models (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1992; Klemperer 1995).
Here it is instead an output of the model and, with P12 in the
denominator, continues to reflect forward-looking users. At
the same time, while the price elasticity facilitates the
derivation of a firm’s profit-maximizing price in one-sided
markets, in two-sided platforms price derivation requires data
on the price elasticity for the other side of the market as well
(Arce 2020b; Tatsumoto 2021), which is beyond the scope of
the present analysis. Hence, prices are characterized rather
than explicitly derived. For example,

oenP
11
oP21

\0 implies

o2 n
oP11 oP21

[ 0 (Vives 2018).
CSP 2’s first-order condition is

oP22
on
on
¼
P21 þ ðN  nÞ 
½V 2  k2 V þ P11 
oP21
oP21
oP21
¼ 0:
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Fig. 1 Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria

The following implicit function characterizes CSP 2’s
best reply function:
F 2 ðP11 ; P21 ; k2 Þ ¼ N  n 

on
½P21 þ V 2  k2 V þ P11 
oP21

¼ 0:
ð5Þ
The number of CSP 2 users is
Nn¼

on
½P21 þ V 2  k2 V þ P11 :
oP21

ð6Þ

An interior solution requires N - n [ 0 ) oPon21 [ 0;
i.e., the number of CSP 1 users increases in CSP 2’s firstperiod price. From the user perspective the two CSPs are
substitutes.
5.2 First-Period Nash Prices
The first-order conditions characterize a CSP’s best reply
function as an implicit function. In what follows the
majority of the derivations are for CSP 1, understanding
similar ones hold for CSP 2. Applying the implicit
function theorem to CSP 1’s best reply function, F1, in
Eq. (3):

oF 1
dP11 
oP21
¼

oF 1
dP21 F 1
oP
11

¼

on
oP21

2

n
þ oPon11 þ oP11o oP
 ½P11 þ V 1  k1 V þ P21 
21
o2 P1
oP211

:

The denominator is negative by the second-order condition. Multiplying the denominator by the coefficient - 1,
calculating the value of oPon21 from Eq. (4), simplifying, and
signing known terms:
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ðþÞ

zﬄ}|ﬄ{
on

dP11 
oP21
¼
[ 0:
oF
dP21 F1

oP11
|ﬄ{zﬄ}


ðÞ

dP11 
dP21 F

When
[ 0; first period prices P11 and P21 are
1
strategic complements.3 If one CSP increases (decreases)
its first-period price, the other CSP’s best reply is to
increase (decrease) its price as well. First-period prices are
also plain complements (Eaton and Eswaran 2002). That is,
oP1
oP2
on
on
oP21 [ 0 because oP21 [ 0; and oP11 [ 0 because oP11 \0:
The left-hand panel of Fig. 1 illustrates this outcome.
Best reply functions F1 and F2 are upward-sloping because
the CSPs’ first-period prices are strategic complements.
The point of intersection is the Nash equilibrium. P1 and
P2 are the isoprofit (level) curves for each CSP. By definition, at each point on a CSP’s best reply function its
isoprofit curve must be tangent to a line corresponding to
the strategy of the other CSP (denoting the maximum
profit, Pi, given Pj1). Plain complements mean CSP 1’s
isoprofit curves increase in value as P21 increases, and CSP
2’s isoprofit curves increase in value as P11 increases. Plain
complements also mean any strategy combination in the
northeast lens of P1 and P2 increases both CSPs’ profits.
This is where the joint-profit maximization outcome lies.
Prices are higher in this event as well.
Result 2. The CSPs’ first-period prices are strategic complements. Nash prices are lower than (i) prices under
perfect lock-in, and (ii) prices under joint profit
maximization.
3

Strategic complements has nothing to do with whether users view
the associated goods or services as complements (e.g., apps and
CSPs) or substitutes (e.g., CSPs in a given layer of the cloud stack).
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Imperfect lock-in results from user’s anti-lock-in
strategies. This begs the question whether CSPs can jointly
raise profits by reducing price competition. A means for
doing so is for one CSP to lead by committing to a price
increase, as explored in the next subsection.
5.3 First-Period Stackelberg Prices
In a Stackelberg or leader–follower game the leader commits to a strategy and the follower plays its best reply to
that strategy. Stackelberg games naturally arise in situations with a dominant market leader, such as AWS and
IaaS. Alternatively, in an infinitely-repeated game, if a CSP
is established enough be considered a long-run player, then
the CSP can achieve a profit arbitrarily close to the one
generated by its Stackelberg strategy provided it faces a
short-run player in each period (Fudenberg and Levine
1992). Entry is a single-period event; hence, an entrant is
an example of a short-run player. The interpretation of
Stackelberg equilibrium that applies depends upon where a
CSP lies in the cloud stack. The greater the fixed costs of
entry, the less applicable is the repeated game interpretation because high entry barriers imply fewer interactions
with entrants.
In a Stackelberg game with CSP 1 as the leader and CSP
2 as the follower, the leader’s profit function becomes
P1(P11, F2(P11, P21)), where F2(P11, P21) is the follower’s
best reply function given in Eq. (5). To wit, CSP 1 maximizes
its profit given the best reply function of CSP 2, F2(P11, P21),
whereas in a Nash equilibrium CSP 1 maximizes its profit
given the strategy of CSP 2, P21. Denoting Pf12 as the follower’s equilibrium strategy and PL11 as the leader’s equilibrium strategy, the first-order conditions for the follower are


oP2
¼ F 2 PL11 ; Pf21 ¼ 0:
ð7Þ
oP21
The first-order conditions for the leader are






oP1 PL11 ;F 2 PL11 ;Pf21
oP1 PL11 ;F 2 PL11 ;Pf21
þ

oP11
oP21
dP21
¼ 0;
dP11
ð8Þ
the second term captures the leader maximizing its profit
given the follower’s best reply to PL11 :
In the right-hand panel of Fig. 1 the Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to the leader’s highest isoprofit curve
given the follower’s best reply. It is the point of tangency,
S, between PL1 and F2. Given first-period prices are
strategic complements, both CSPs’ prices increase relative
to the Nash equilibrium point, N. That is, dP11 [ 0, dP21[ 0. In addition, a second-mover advantage exists; the
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follower’s profit increases more than the leader’s because
the follower can undercut the leader. Namely,




dP2 PL11 ; Pf21 [ dP1 PL11 ; Pf21 :
The total derivatives on both sides of the inequality are:




oP2 PL11 ; Pf21
oP2 PL11 ; Pf21
dP11 þ
dP21
oP11
oP21




oP1 PL11 ; Pf21
oP1 PL11 ; Pf21
[
dP11 þ
dP21 :
oP11
oP21
Dividing both sides by dP11 [ 0, and signing terms,




oP2 PL11 ; Pf21
oP2 PL11 ; Pf21 dP
21
þ

oP11
oP21
dP11
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ} |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ} |ﬄ{zﬄ}
ðþÞ

[

ð0Þ



oP1 PL11 ; Pf21



ðþÞ



oP1 PL11 ; Pf21 dP
21
þ

:
oP11
oP21
dP11
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ð0Þ

The first term on the left-hand side is positive because
prices are plain complements. For the second term, the first
term in the product is zero because it corresponds to the
follower’s first-order condition in Eq. (7). Finally, the
right-hand side of the inequality is zero because it corresponds to the first-order condition for the leader in Eq. (8).
Result 3. Both CSPs are better off if one of them acts as a
first mover (in the Stackelberg sense). The first-mover
(Stackelberg leader) is at a relative disadvantage because
their increase in profits is less than the second-mover’s
(follower’s). A second-mover advantage exists.
When users engage in anti-lock-in strategies, leader–
follower price competition increases CSP’s profits relative
to Nash competition, with the second-mover benefitting
more than the first-mover. Consequently, the outcome
requires CSPs to solve the coordination problem of determining who acts as leader. Alternatively, no coordination
problem occurs if the CSP is a long-run concern facing
potential entrants. The leader instead improves upon its
Nash profit for the stage game by achieving its Stackelberg
profit as a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated
game.

6 First-Mover Advantage in Lock-In Leadership
In the zeroth period, users select their anti-lock-in strategies and CSPs select their security-induced lock-in strategies. The strategies affect k1 and/or k2, with users
attempting to increase their values and CSPs to decrease
them. From the first-order conditions in Eqs. (3) and (5),
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Fig. 2 (Anti-) Lock-in effects

CSP 1’s best reply function is an implicit function of k1,
and CSP 2’s is an implicit function of k2.
By the implicit function theorem,
ðÞ


oF1
dP11 
ok1
¼  oF
1
dk1 F1
oP

11

zﬄ}|ﬄ{
on
V
oP11
¼ 2
\0:
o P1
oP211
|ﬄ{zﬄ}

ð9Þ

ðÞ by SOC

By similar methods,

dP21 
\0:
dk 

ð10Þ

2 F2

The left-hand panel in Fig. 2 illustrates
the case where a


11
CSP 1 user increases k1. Given dP
dk1  \0; CSP 1’s best
F1

reply function shifts to Fb1 : First-period prices decrease for
both CSPs. The intuition is as follows. CSP 1’s secondperiod price satisfies the no-switching constraint, making
demand (the number of users) the same in both periods. At
the same time, an increase in k1 puts downward pressure on
P12. CSP 1’s revenue over both periods depends upon it
inducing more adoptions in the first period. It does so by
reducing P11. In response, CSP 2 decreases P21 because P11
and P21 are strategic complements.
One must recognize, however, the effect on CSP 1 is
only [1/n(P11, P21)]dk1; i.e., there is no spillover from one
user’s anti-lock-in strategy affecting the degree other users
are locked-in. Hence, the shift in the CSP’s best reply
function due to a single user’s anti-lock-in strategy is much
smaller than for a CSP’s lock-in strategy, which affects its
entire user base. Consequently, a role for government
exists in reducing interoperability barriers such as securityinduced lock-in. Regulation has a market-wide effect
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whereas individual user’s anti-lock-in strategies do not.
Moreover, the reduction in prices association such regulation is welfare-increasing for users, as consumer surplus
is the difference between valuation and price in each
period.
In the absence of regulation, when CSP ‘i’ increases
lock-in, ki decreases. This is illustrated in the right-hand
panel of Fig. 2. By the comparative statics in Eqs. (9) and
(10), when both CSPs increase lock-in the new best reply
functions are F~1 and F~2 : At the new equilibrium both firstperiod prices increase. The logic is as follows. Increasing
lock-in implies each CSP can raise its second-period price.
Users who look ahead and reason back realize this, hence,
they cannot be induced into adopting a CSP by a low price
in the first period. Accordingly, both CSPs raise their firstperiod price.
The right-hand panel in Fig. 2 captures novel and
important implications of security-induced lock-in. If either
CSP unilaterally increases their degree of security-induced
lock-in, dki \ 0, the equilibrium is in the profit-improving
lens of the isoprofit curves for the Nash equilibrium. Given
strategic complementarity in the first period, both CSPs
benefit from either introducing or enhancing their securityinduced lock-in. If CSP 1 increases P11 via decreasing k1, it
additionally induces CSP 2 to increase P21. Moreover, if
both CSPs increase their security-induced lock-in, the new
equilibrium is even further northeast in the profit-improving lens.
Finally, if CSP 1 leads by introducing or enhancing its
security-induced lock-in, a first-mover advantage exists if:




dP1 P~11 ; P~21 ; k~1 [ dP2 P~11 ; P~21 ; k~2 :
Totally differentiating each profit function,
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oP1
oP1
oP1
 dP11 þ
 dP21 þ
 dk1 [
oP11
oP21
ok1
:
oP2
oP2
oP1
 dP11 þ
 dP21 þ
 dk2
oP11
oP21
ok2
By the first-order conditions that derive each CSP’s best
oP1
oP2
¼ 0; oP
¼ 0: CSP 2 is passive, so
reply function, oP
11
21
dk2 = 0. The inequality becomes
oP1
oP1
oP2
 dP21 þ
 dk1 [
 dP11 :
oP21
od1
oP11
Recognizing that dk1 \ 0 ) dP11, dP21 [ 0 (refer to the
right-hand panel of Fig. 2), and dividing through by dk1\ 0 yields
oP1
\
ok1
|{z}
ðÞ
ðok1 \0 ) oP1 [ 0Þ
ðplain
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leader’s price commitment leaves an opening for price
undercutting by the follower. By contrast, security-induced
lock-in softens the intensity of price competition in the
CSP market. Higher profits are therefore attributable to a
reduction in price competition leading to a favorable outcome in an otherwise subscription-based market. When
Eq. (11) is satisfied, CSP market structure is defined by
leadership on security-induced lock-in rather than undercutting one’s rival. Security figures into the characterization of CSP competition.
Equation (11) also identifies what CSP management
needs to measure in order to identify when the incentives
for leadership hold. Specifically, the right-hand side of the

oP2
dP11


oP11
dk1
|ﬄ{zﬄ}
|ﬄ{zﬄ}
ðþÞ
ðÞ
complementsÞ ðdk1 \0 ) dP11 [ 0Þ ðplain

oP1
dP21

:
oP21
dk1
|ﬄ{zﬄ}
|ﬄ{zﬄ}
ðþÞ
ðÞ
complementsÞ ðdk1 \0 ) dP21 [ 0Þ

equation is expressed in terms of differences in cross-price
effects on profitability, which are positive because prices
are plain complements. In particular, the less sensitive a
oP1
oP1 dP21 oP2 dP11




[
: CSP’s profits are to a rival’s price, the more likely it gains
ok
oP21 dk1 oP11 dk1
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ1}
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
from security-induced lock-in. If one considers Cloud 1.0
Direct effect
Indirect effect : differences in the CSPs0 to be pay-as-you-go services allowing users to convert
of # k1 on " P1 ;
profit sensitivity to their rivals0 price
fixed costs into variable ones, and Cloud 2.0 as CSPs
ð11Þ
increasing their value proposition for users through
increased functionality, Result 4 suggests a hastening from
Increasing a CSP’s degree of lock-in creates direct and
Cloud 1.0 to 2.0. In other words, the increased prices
indirect effects. The direct effect is it is harder for users to
stemming from security-induced lock-in need to be
switch. The magnitude of the direct effect on CSP 1’s
accompanied by CSPs increasing their value proposition
profits, in absolute terms, is given in the left-hand side of
for users. For example, PaaS’s are beginning to offer
Eq. (11). The indirect effect is lock-in allows both CSPs to
value-adding components such as analytics, artificial
raise first-period prices. But raising prices comes at the
intelligence, and blockchains. Another implication for CSP
potential tradeoff of being undercut. This balancing act is
market evolution is decreased cross-price effects on profmeasured on the right-hand side of Eq. (11). As prices are
itability can also be produced through vertical integration
plain complements, both terms are positive. When the
within the cloud stack. This, however, has its own potential
inequality is satisfied, CSPs can use security-induced lockto be anti-competitive.
in to create both an increase in profits and a first-mover
advantage.
Result 4. Both CSPs’ profits increase when either CSP
7 Discussion
increases their degree of security-induced lock-in (or if
both do so). Moreover, under the conditions given in
Information technology platforms often use security tools
Eq. (11), a first-mover advantage exists. This works in
such as cryptography and tamper-resistance to facilitate
favor of security-induced lock-in and against the prospects
user lock-in as part of the platform’s profit strategy (Anfor standardization in the cloud. From the users’ perderson 2004, 2020). For cloud services providers (CSPs),
spective, it highlights the importance of anti-lock-in
security-induced lock-in decreases CSPs’ vulnerability to
strategies and interoperability regulation.
rivals attempting to get users to switch via price competiThe result stands in stark contrast to the second-mover
tion, and to unlicensed complementors’ attempting to
advantage established for price competition. In particular, a
Multiplying both sides by - 1,
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market compatible products. Lookabaugh and Sicker
(2004) similarly observe that security-induced lock-in
allows IT platforms to control potential complementors’
access to users, and facilitates razor-and-blades pricing
strategies for additional services and components. These
studies intimate that security plays a privileged role in
lock-in.
The privileged role is shown to be a consequence of
security’s effect on platform competition. Specifically,
CSPs satisfy no-switching constraints to remain competitive within a platform environment. One way to satisfy the
constraint is through security-induced lock-in. Moreover,
users recognize this potentiality. Accordingly, the degree
of lock-in is determined by users’ anti-lock-in strategies
and CSPs’ security-induced lock-in strategies. In this
context, CSPs increase profits by increasing their degree of
lock-in. It is consistent with Opara-Martins et al. (2016)
conjecture that the anticompetitive nature of the CSP
market is the result of interoperability and data portability
constraints stemming from CSPs’ proprietary protocols.
Indeed, both CSPs’ profits increase when only one of the
CSPs introduces or enhances security-induced lock-in.
Cloud-based standards for semantics, technologies, and
interfaces are therefore not in the interest of CSPs.
The situation is exacerbated when security-induced
lock-in results in a first-mover advantage. This study
derives previously unidentified conditions for such an
advantage to exist. Specifically, a first-mover advantage in
security-induced lock-in occurs when the resultant crossprice effects of the rival’s prices its profits are less that the
cross-price effects of its prices on its rival’s profits. Consequently, the CSP competitive environment is characterized by market leaders using security and proprietary
standards to limit interoperability and data portability.
These first-mover advantage conditions are also of
interest to a second group of managers; namely, CSP users.
The conditions fail if users’ anti-lock-in strategies sufficiently diminish the first-mover’s profits. Examples of antilock-in strategies include using a hybrid cloud; using a CSP
broker; specifying the terms of exit and access to data
within the service level agreement; adopting a CSP that
uses standard interfaces and APIs; containerization; and
adopting a CSP employing standard open security protocols. Unfortunately, CSPs have countermeasures. For
example, a CSP may implement proprietary security
extensions to standard security protocols. The good news
for users is CSP price increases stemming from securityinduced lock-in are easier to implement if they are
accompanied by increases in the CSPs’ value proposition
for users, consistent with the cross-profit conditions for a
first-mover advantage derived from the present analysis.
Moreover, the paper identifies another reason for IT
management to be wary of the adverse effects of
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cryptography. Young and Yung (1996) predict the advent
of ransomware, and this event has come to pass. One
response to the threat of ransomware is for a user’s CSP to
cryptographically secure their data, and yet we show this
can lead to data lock-in.
More generally, the paper identifies another facet of
security that critically affects the nature of IT platform
competition. CSPs prefer to lead in a competitive playing
field characterized by (security-induced) lock-in rather than
price leadership. Moreover, the current study shows that
users need not be completely locked-in for CSPs to be able
price as if they are. These insights provide rationales for
regulation limiting interoperability and portability barriers.
Specifically, regulations have an industry-wide effect
whereas a user’s anti-lock-in strategy has no such spillover.
A potential direction for future research is a multiperiod
analysis. There are, however, several reasons why our
results are likely to continue to hold. First, users are forward-looking; hence, they cannot be duped by lower prices
in any single period. Second, security-induced lock-in is an
intertemporal strategic complementarity. Third, the noswitching constraints must persist in order for the CSP
market to remain non-monopolistic and this tempers the
degree to which the first two phenomena relax price
competition.
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Crémer J, Biglaiser G (2012) Switching costs and network effects in
competition policy. In: Harrington JE, Katsoulacos Y (eds)
Recent advances in the analysis of competition policy and
regulation. Edward Elgar, Northampton, pp 13–27
Eaton BC, Eswaran M (2002) Noncooperative equilibria in 1-Shot
games: a synthesis. In: Eaton BC (ed) Applied microeconomic
theory. Edward Elgar, Northampton, pp 118–149
Farrell J, Klemperer P (2007) Coordination and lock-in: competition
with switching costs and network effects. In: Armstrong M,
Porter R (eds) Handbook of industrial organization, vol 3.
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1967–2072
Fonash P, Schneck P (2015) Cybersecurity: from months to
milliseconds. Computer 46(1):42–50
Fudenberg D, Levine DK (1992) Maintaining a reputation when
strategies are imperfectly observed. Rev Econ Stud
59(3):561–579
Gordon LA, Loeb MP (2002) The economics of information security
investment. ACM Trans Inf Syst Secur 5(4):438–457
Greenberg J (1989) Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria from an abstract game. J Econ Theory 49(1):195–202
Hogan M, Sokol A, Liu F, Tong J (2011) NIST cloud computing
standards roadmap. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 500-291, Gaithersburg
Kahn CM, Mookherjee D (1992) The good, the bad, and the ugly:
coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games. Games Econ Behav
4(1):101–121
Katz ML, Shapiro C (1992) Product introduction with network
externalities. J Ind Econ 40(1):55–83
Klemperer P (1995) Competition when consumers have switching
costs: an overview with applications to industrial organization,
macroeconomics, and international trade. Rev Econ Stud
62(4):515–539
Knipp E, Clayton T, Watson R (2016) A guidance framework for
architecting portable cloud and multicloud applications. Gartner,
Stamford
Lee R (2014) Competing platforms. J Econ Manag Strategy
23(3):507–526
Lookabaugh T, Sicker DC (2004) Security and lock-in. In: Camp LJ,
Lewis S (eds) Economics of information security. Kluwer
Academic, Norwell, pp 225–246
Lynn T (2021) Dear Cloud, I think we have trust issues: cloud
computing contracts and trust. In: Lynn T et al (eds) Cloud
computing contracts and trust. Palgrave, Cham, pp 21–42
Opara-Martins J, Sahandi R, Tian F (2016) Critical analysis of vendor
lock-in and its impact on cloud computing migration: a business
perspective. J Cloud Comput Adv Syst Appl 5(4):1–18
Padilla AJ (1991) Consumer switching costs: a survey. Invest Econ
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